Dieser Band enthält Husserls letzte grosse Arbeit, an der er von 1934 bis 1937 arbeitete. Husserl weist darin die Probleme auf, die seiner Ansicht nach zu der Krise geführt haben, in der die Menschheit der Gegenwart sich befindet. Er verfolgt den Ursprung dieser Krise zurück bis zur Entstehung der neuzeitlichen mathematischen Naturwissenschaften bei Galilei, um aufzuweisen, wie es zu der verhängnisvollen Spaltung des physikalistischen Objektivismus und des transzendentalen Subjektivismus gekommen ist. Die Geschichte der neuzeitlichen Philosophie wird von Descartes über Locke (...) - Berkeley - Hume bis zu Kant verfolgt. Husserl stellt dar, wie es das eigentliche Anliegen der Phänomenologie ist den verhängnisvollen Riss zu überwinden, indem sie den Rückgang zu dem Sinnesfundament vollzieht, das in den Wissenschaften selbst und für diese verborgen bleibt. In diesem Zusammenhang kommt gerade der Wissenschaft vom Menschen, der Psychologie, eine fundamentale Bedeutung zu, allerdings einer Psychologie, die auf der Phänomenologie gründet und von ihren Erkenntnissen ausgeht. Ausser dem erhaltenen Haupttext befinden sich im Husserl-Archiv noch zahlreiche "Forschungsmanuskripte", die im Zusammenhang mit der Krisis-Problematik entstanden sind. Um auch in sie Einblick zu geben wurde eine umfassende Auswahl in Form von Beilagen veröffentlicht, sowie noch einige selbständige Abhandlungen die die Entstehungsgeschichte des Werkes erhellen. (shrink)

Die in diesem Buche entwickelte Staatslehre ist aus den Er gebnissen meiner Schrift: "die Lehre der Rechtssouveränität" (1906) hervorgegangen. Während jene Schrift insbesondere die Lehre von der Staatssouveränität kritisierte, bezweckt die jetzt vorliegende hauptsächlich, die positiven Grundlagen der ge genüberstehenden Lehre von der Rechtssouveränität auseinan derzusetzen und damit die moderne Staatsidee zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Auch diese Schrift wurde in der niederländischen Sprache, meiner Muttersprache, abgefasst, ist aber in eine den Auslän dern zugänglichere Sprache übersetzt worden, wofür ich auch diesmal (...) die deutsche Sprache wählte, weil die Ergebnisse spe ziell denjenigen der deutschen Staatswissenschaft gegenüber Stellung nehmen. Der Uebersetzung liegt das unter dem gleichen Titel in nie derländischer Sprache erschienene Werk, welches im Jahre 1915 veröffentlicht wurde, aber bereits vor dem Kriege druck in fertig war, zu grunde. Nachher veröffentlichte ich, gleichfalls niederländischer Sprache, eine Schrift: "Het Rechtsgezag" (1917), welche, anlässlich der hierzulande erschienenen Kriti ken, eine Verteidigung und Erläuterung der modernen Staats idee enthielt. Diese Schrift ist in der hier vorliegenden mitver arbeitet worden, demzufolge diese deutsche Ausgabe eine Zu sammenfassung der beiden obenerwähnten niederländischen Schriften bietet. H.K. LEIDEN, Mai 1919. INHALTSVERZEICHNIS. Seite EINLEITUNG. DIE MODERNE STAATS IDEE ERSTES KAPITEL STAATSAUTORITÄT UND RECHTSAUTORITÄT. 3 I. Der Gegensatz zwischen der alten und der neuen Staatsidee "... 3 11. Das Aufkommen der modernen Staatsidee. 6 111. Die Bedeutung der modernen Staatsidee 9 ZWEITES KAPITEL. (shrink)

The paper offers an analysis of the interview data collected in the project "Politics and everyday life: Three years later" in terms of three main topics: attitudes to the political sphere, change of social system, and the democratic public sphere. The analysis focuses on ambivalences expressed in the responses which, under the surface of overall disappointment and discontent, may contain preserved results of the previously achieved "social learning" and their positive potentials. The main objective was to examine to what extent (...) the processes of political maturation of citizens, identified in the 2002 study, have continued. After pointing to a number of shifts in people?s views of politics which generally do not contradict the tendencies outlined in 2002, it is argued that the process of rationalization of political culture has not stopped, but it manifests itself differently in changed circumstances. The republican euphoria of 2002 has been replaced by resignation, with a stronger individualist orientation and a commitment to professional achievement. Clanak analizira gradju dobijenu intervjuima u okviru istrazivanja "Politika i svakodnevni zivot - tri godine posle" u pogledu tri krupne teme: odnos prema politici, promena drustvenog poretka i demokratska javnost. Analiza se usredsredjuje na ambivalencije izrazene u iskazima ispitanika koje, ispod opste atmosfere razocaranosti i nezadovoljstva, mogu kriti ocuvane rezultate prethodnog "socijalnog ucenja" i njihove pozitivne potencijale. Osnovni cilj je ispitati u kojoj meri su procesi politickog sazrevanja gradjana, uoceni u istrazivanju iz 2002, nastavljeni i u kasnijem razdoblju. Posle izdvajanja jednog broja pomaka u odnosu na stavove prema politickoj sferi iz 2002, koji u osnovi ne protivrece tada ocrtanim tendencijama, zakljucuje se da proces racionalizovanja politicke kulture nije prekinut, ali se u novim uslovima ocituje na drugaciji nacin. Republikansku euforiju iz neposredno postpetooktobarskog razdoblja zamenila je rezignacija, uz narastanje individualizma i okretanje profesionalnom postignucu. (shrink)

In dem vorliegenden Band werden Arbeiten zusammengefafh, die sich kritisch mit Fragen von aus dem Marxschen Ideologiebegriff abgeleiteten Gesellschaftstheorien ebenso befassen wie mit der Komplexitat des Marxschen Ideologiebegriffs selbst, den orthodox-marxistischen und den marxistisch-revisionistischen Ideologietheorien, ihrem Wandel, ihren politisch-ideologischen Funktionen in unterschiedlichen histo­ risch-gesellschaftlichen Beziigen und, nicht zuletzt, ihrer theoretisch-methodologi­ schen Verwendbarkeit fiir das Verstandnis von Geist und Geschichte einerseits, Poli­ tik und Gesellschaft andererseits. Die hier versammelten Studien sind in den Jahren von 1960 bis 1975 entstanden. Sie beruhen zum (...) Teil auf Vorarbeiten, die bis in die Jahre 1954/55 zuriickreichen. Zwei Arbeiten sind bisher unveroffentlicht: der Einleitungsaufsatz »Ideologie und Ideologiebegriff. Dberlegungen zu ihrer metatheoretischen und immanent-kriti­ schen Aufarbeitung« (S. XIII-XVIII u. 1-21) und die Abhandlung »Entwurf einer Typologie des Ideologiebegriffs« (S. 82-102); aIle anderen Arbeiten sind, an ver­ streuten Stellen, bereits erschienen. 1m Laufe des letzten Jahrzehnts hat sich die theoretische Position des Verfassers insofern geklart, als er heute bestimmte Perspektiven der Wissenssoziologie und der Ideologiekritik mit einem historisch-soziologisch orientierten Funktionalismus in seinen metatheoretischen, d. h. theoretischen und forschungspraktischen, Beziigen systematisch aufzuweisen sucht. Damit wird einmal versucht, die These von der hi­ storisch-sozialen Bedingtheit von Theoriebildungen praziser als in der alteren Wis­ senssoziologie zu begriinden und historisches BewuBtsein durch positive Forschung neu zu fundieren. Mit einem solchen Ansatz versucht der Verfasser zweitens, die Kluft zwischen normativ-praskriptiven und empirisch-deskriptiven Forschungsan­ satzen, die in den Sozialwissenschaften weiterhin besteht, zu iiberbriicken. (shrink)

A book filled with inspirations, tools, and techniques, offers a practical guide to discovering the power of living fully and completely in the now and significantly reducing stress by embracing Buddhist wisdom.

Der aktuelle Eurozentrismus führt dazu, dass Europa und hier insbesondere die Europäische Union verschiedene Entwicklungen und Ereignisse in den internationalen Beziehungen falsch auffassen und interpretieren. Der Autor setzt sich thesenhaft mit diesem Phänomen auseinander und zeigt auf, wie es durch eine eurozentristische Sichtweise, die er als Überbewertung europäischer Interessen, Bedürfnisse, Strukturen und Ereignisse versteht, zu einer verzerrten Wahrnehmung der internationalen Politik durch die Europäer kommt.

In this article, I cast doubt on an apparent truism, namely, that if evidence is available for gathering and use at a negligible cost, then it’s always instrumentally rational for us to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions. Call this ‘value of information’ (VOI). I show that VOI conflicts with two other plausible theses. The first is the view that an agent’s evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. The second is the view that epistemic (...) rationality requires us to update our credences by conditionalization. These two theses, given some plausible assumptions, make room for rationally biased inquiries where VOI fails. I go on to argue that this is bad news for defenders of VOI. (shrink)

An important question in epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that p is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that p. We explain how a “transparency” account of self-knowledge, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that such an account allows us to reconcile a version (...) of the KK principle with an “externalist” or “reliabilist” conception of knowledge commonly thought to make that principle particularly problematic. (shrink)

According to Bayesian orthodoxy, an agent should update---or at least should plan to update---her credences by conditionalization. Some have defended this claim by means of a diachronic Dutch book argument. They say: an agent who does not plan to update her credences by conditionalization is vulnerable (by her own lights) to a diachronic Dutch book, i.e., a sequence of bets which, when accepted, guarantee loss of utility. Here, I show that this argument is in tension with evidence externalism, i.e., the (...) view that an agent's evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. I argue that this tension casts doubt on the idea that diachronic Dutch books can be used to justify or vindicate updating plans. (shrink)

Views of western ethicists on conduct of life by human beings and existential ethics; contributed articles translated from various western languages.

It is widely supposed that evolutionary debunking arguments against morality constitute a type of epistemological objection to our moral beliefs. In particular, the debunking force of such arguments is not supposed to depend on the metaphysical claim that moral facts do not exist. In this paper I argue that this standard epistemological construal of EDAs is highly misleading, if not mistaken. Specifically, I argue that the most widely discussed EDAs all make key and controversial metaphysical claims about the nature of (...) morality or the possibility of moral truth that belie their apparently epistemological character. I show that the debunking force of these EDAs derives largely from metaphysical claims about morality and their implications for the possibility of moral reduction, rather than from epistemological worries associated with the existence of an causal/non-moral explanation of our moral judgments. The paper briefly concludes with a dilemma that I believe confronts all EDAs such as those discussed in this paper: either such arguments are unsound, or else they prove too much, debunking our knowledge of science and the external world, as well as morality. (shrink)

A ‘companions in guilt’ strategy against moral error theory aims to show that the latter proves too much: if sound, it supports an implausible error-theoretic conclusion in other areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie [2016 Cowie, C. 2016. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94/1: 115–30.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]] has recently produced what he claims is a ‘master argument’ against (...) all such strategies. The essence of his argument is that CG arguments cannot work because they are afflicted by internal incoherence or inconsistency. I argue, first, that Cowie's master argument does not succeed. Beyond this, I argue that there is no good reason to think that any such argument—one that purports to identify an internal incoherence in CG arguments—can succeed. Second, I argue that the main substantive area of disagreement between error theorists and CG theorists essentially concerns the conceptual profile of epistemic reasons—specifically, whether they are strongly categorical—not the ontological question of whether such reasons exist. I then develop an argument in favour of the CG theorist's position by considering the moral error theorist's arguments in support of the conceptual claim that moral reasons are strongly categorical. These include, notably, criticisms made by Joyce [2011] and Olson [2014] of Finlay's [2008] ‘end relational’ view of morality, according to which moral reasons are relative to some end or standard, hence not strongly categorical. Examining these criticisms, I argue that, based on what moral error theorists have said regarding the conceptual profile of moral reasons, there is a strong case to be made that moral reasons are strongly categorical if and only if epistemic reasons are. (shrink)

Recently, several epistemologists have defended an attractive principle of epistemic rationality, which we shall call Ur-Prior Conditionalization. In this essay, I ask whether we can justify this principle by appealing to the epistemic goal of accuracy. I argue that any such accuracy-based argument will be in tension with Evidence Externalism, i.e., the view that agent's evidence may entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. This is because any such argument will crucially require the assumption that, independently of all empirical evidence, (...) it is rational for an agent to be certain that her evidence will always include truths, and that she will always have perfect introspective access to her own evidence. This assumption is in tension with Evidence Externalism. I go on to suggest that even if we don't accept Evidence Externalism, the prospects for any accuracy-based justification for Ur-Prior Conditionalization are bleak. (shrink)

This essay explores a problem for Nyāya epistemologists. It concerns the notion of pramā. Roughly speaking, a pramā is a conscious mental event of knowledge-acquisition, i.e., a conscious experience or thought in undergoing which an agent learns or comes to know something. Call any event of this sort a knowledge-event. The problem is this. On the one hand, many Naiyāyikas accept what I will call the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge, the view that a conscious experience or thought is a knowledge-event (...) just in case it is true and non-recollective. On the other hand, they are also committed to what I shall call Nyāya Infallibilism, the thesis that every knowledge-event is produced by causes that couldn’t have given rise to an error. These two commitments seem to conflict with each other in cases of epistemic luck, i.e., cases where an agent arrives a true judgement accidentally or as a matter of luck. While the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge seems to predict that these judgements are knowledge-events, Nyāya Infallibilism seems to entail that they aren’t. In this essay, I show that Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the 14th century Naiyāyika, solves this problem by adopting what I call epistemic localism, the view that upstream causal factors play no epistemically significant role in the production of knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper I evaluate some recent virtue-ethical accounts of right action [Hursthouse 1999; Slote 2001; Swanton 2001]. I argue that all are vulnerable to what I call the insularity objection : evaluating action requires attention to worldly consequences external to the agent, whereas virtue ethics is primarily concerned with evaluating an agent's inner states. More specifically, I argue that insofar as these accounts are successful in meeting the insularity objection they invite the circularity objection : they end up relying (...) upon putatively virtue-ethical considerations that themselves depend on unexplained judgments of rightness. Such accounts thus face a dilemma that is characteristic of virtue-ethical accounts of right action. They avoid the insularity objection only at the cost of inviting the circularity objection: they become intuitively plausible roughly to the extent that they lose their distinctively virtue-ethical character. (shrink)